How to derive moral values from scientific principles. Examines the limites of social responsibility andthe implications of genetic social policies.

Clinical trials for acute conditions such as myocardial infarction and stroke pose challenges related to informed consent due to time limitations, stress, and severe illness. Consent processes shou...

Volume 20, Issue 8, August 2020, Page W12-W13.

Research has demonstrated that people readily pay more attention to negative than to positive and/or neutral stimuli. However, evidence from recent studies indicated that such an attention bias to negative information is not obligatory but sensitive to various factors. Two experiments using intergroup evaluative tasks (Study 1: a gender-related groups evaluative task and Study 2: a minimal-related groups evaluative task) was conducted to determine whether motivation to strive for a positive social identity - a part of one's self-concept - drives (...) attention toward affective stimuli. Using the P1 component of event-related brain potentials (ERPs) as a neural index of attention, we confirmed that attention bias toward negative stimuli is not mandatory but it can depend on a motivational focus on affective outcomes. Results showed that social identity-based motivation is likely to bias attention toward affectively incongruent information. Thereby, early onset processes - reflected by the P1 component - appeared susceptible to top-down attentional influences induced by the individual's motivation to strive for a positive social identity. (shrink)

L'influence de John Courtney Murray sur le développement - enchâssé dans Dignitatis Humanae- de l'enseignement de l'Église sur la liberté religieuse est largement connu. L'article montre que le caractère définitif de la contribution de Murray provient de deux perspectives centrales, l'une et l'autre issues des écrits de Bernard Lonergan. Tout d'abord, l'appropriation par Murray de la notion du «surgissement historique de la conscience» - que l'on ne conçoit pas simplement comme une attention aux événements et aux contextes historiques, mais (...) aussi à une «différenciation» propre de la conscience personnelle, sociale et ecclésiale - offre une clé de solution pour résoudre l'impasse créée par les vues conflictuelles, lors du Concile, sur la liberté religieuse. L'étude historique et théologique approfondie de Murray -avant, pendant et après le Concile - sur les thématiques qui touchent la question de la liberté religieuse est ensuite présentée comme une expression concrètement à l'oeuvre des «huit spécialités fonctionnelles» décrites par Méthode en théologie , lesquelles fondent la doctrine des Pères conciliaires pour lesquels un développement de l'enseignement social et moral de l'Église est nécessaire. (shrink)

Il ne va pas de soi que l’alchimie, science du perfectionnement des métaux, se soit intéressée à la prolongation de la vie. C’est en fait à la faveur des ambiguïtés lexicales et conceptuelles liées aux termes désignant les substances chimiques que s’est effectué dans l’alchimie arabe un rapprochement entre la perfection des métaux et la guérison des êtres vivants. La doctrine de la quintessence de Rupescissa, puis les théories de Paracelse achèveront cette évolution qui donne à l’alchimie sa double dimension, (...) chimique et médicale, rationnelle et mythique. (shrink)

This book pays tribute to Bernard of Chartes’s observation, “We are like dwarfs standing on the shoulders of giants.” For Hauser’s translation of the texts of Philip the Chancellor, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas, along with his introduction to the same, reveals that, if there is any truth in the claim that the medieval thinkers lacked a sense of history, their commitment to the preservation and transmission of texts nevertheless shows that they understood that their own intellectual progress (...) depended on maintaining continuity with the thought of their predecessors. Hauser writes that his original intention was simply to translate Aquinas’s Quaestio disputata de virtutibus in communi, but that in the course of translating, he discovered that, contrary to widespread opinion, Albert the Great had influenced Aquinas’s thinking on the virtues more than did Aristotle. (shrink)

This essay argues that realism in ethics and in politics is best understood as a discipline of mind directed against wishful thinking. Reading Geuss in this context, against the background of the work of Bernard Williams, allows us to specify what is of value in his work as well as to illustrate the limitations – of argument and of tone – of that work. More specifically, it is argued that while the fairly catholic character of Geuss′s realism is a (...) strength, his critical considerations of theorists such as Rawls and Nozick and concepts such as human rights not only show little intellectual grasp of these positions, but also typically fail to respect his own criteria for understanding and evaluating political theories. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the approach to the study of political and legal phenomena that can be defined “critical realism” and with its apparent paradox. By “critical realism” I understand a way of looking at political and legal phenomena that combines a blunt analysis of social reality with a transformative, non-resigned critical attitude towards the status quo. I argue that this is the approach that inspired Danilo Zolo’s lifelong reflections on politics and law. The same approach, moreover, is in my (...) opinion shared by authors such as Raymond Geuss and Bernard Williams, who, since the beginning of the new millennium, have contributed to re-shape the international debate on the methods of political philosophy. Inherent in this approach is a paradox that can be encapsulated in the following two questions. First, if the theoretical analysis should not start from ideals and principles, but must instead take as point of departure the social and political situation in which we are inescapably entangled (both central assumptions of the critical realism), how is it possible to gain the distance necessary for criticisms? Second, if we cannot transcend our societal reality and cannot therefore rely on external and objective values, on which basis is it possible to suggest “better” alternatives to the status quo? The mentioned authors could not explain convincingly, in my opinion, how these two questions can be answered. However, and this is the central claim of the article, the paradox is not unresolvable. The two questions mentioned above can be answered, so my argument, by recurring, respectively, to the negativism characteristic of Judith Shklar’s approach to political and legal theory and to the concept of “immanent critique” as understood by Rahel Jaeggi. Shklar convincingly shows that the critique of the status quo can be made not notwithstanding the blunt analysis of social reality, but exactly in reason of it. In order to recognise abuses of power and injustices, so her argument, we do not need an ideal theory of justice or of the perfect state. On the contrary, nothing better than history and the analysis of contemporary social reality can show us that injustices and abuses of power are a recurring and ever possible characteristics of politics. Jaeggi’s concept on immanent critique, moreover, indicates how it is possible to build an alternative to the criticized situation that is not anchored on transcendent principles and yet can plausibly explain why the suggested alternative is “better” than the status quo. Finally, I argue that both Shklars’ negativism and Jaeggi’s concept of immanent critique operate implicitly in Zolo’s approach, but that they, having not being made explicit, could not develop their whole potential. (shrink)

Political realism has been criticised for its methodological claims about normativity and for its criticisms of moralism. Realists themselves should be more concerned that for all its methodological wrangling, realists have struggled to produce much positive theorising, rendering realism barren. I argue that realism, in both its liberal and radical forms, is currently barren in the sense of being unproductive, and show how the two dominant forms of realism are barren in different ways. Bernard Williams’s liberal realism exclusively derives (...) its normative resources from existing political practices, values, and institutions, which leads it to replicate the status quo and precludes external criticism. Radical realism, represented here by Raymond Geuss, is barren because the fear of succumbing to moralism or ‘normativism’ leads radical realists to wrongly abjure normativity altogether. Having shown that both forms of realism are barren I argue that radical realists should adopt a method of political theory as story-telling as a way to avoid both moralism and barrenness. While realists are right to be wary of normative prescription, I argue that realists need to tell a story about which political transformations are desirable and why or else risk succumbing barrenness. I give a brief illustration of story-telling in practice then address some objections to story-telling as a productive method. (shrink)

This paper outlines an account of political realism as a form of ideology critique. Our focus is a defence of the normative edge of this critical-theoretic project against the common charge that there is a problematic trade-off between a theory’s groundedness in facts about the political status quo and its ability to consistently envisage radical departures from the status quo. To overcome that problem we combine insights from three distant corners of the philosophical landscape: theories of legitimacy by Bernard (...) Williams and other realists, Frankfurt School-inspired Critical Theory, and recent analytic epistemological and metaphysical theories of cognitive bias, ideology, and social construction. The upshot is a novel account of realism as empirically-informed diagnosis- critique of social and political phenomena. This view rejects a sharp divide between descriptive and normative theory, and so is an alternative to the anti- empiricism of some approaches to Critical Theory as well as to the complacency towards existing power structures found within liberal realism, let alone mainstream normative political philosophy, liberal or otherwise. (shrink)

This article offers a realist interpretation of Tacitus’s analysis of political failure. Tacitus described the early Roman Empire as a balance between the conflicting and irreconcilable values and interests of the emperor, the army, and the senate. For him Stoic-republican morality in itself—without the intervention of a political standard demanding political agency in every circumstance—cannot provide an all-purpose guide to action. He provides a fine-grained analysis of types of political failure, such as failing to act, or to realize one’s limited (...) scope for maneuver, or the inevitability of failure given particular political circumstances. Tacitus also describes Thrasea, a moderate member of the senatorial opposition to Nero, as an exceptionally laudable figure. His preference for moderate politics places Tacitus on the side of contemporary status-quo oriented, liberal, realists (e.g., Bernard Williams), rather than on the side of radical realists (e.g., Raymond Geuss, Enzo Rossi), but the central lesson of his understanding of Roman politics is not so much that political order is fragile as that the cost of political failure can indeed be unbearably high. (shrink)

One of the more debated topics in the recent realist literature concerns the compatibility of realism and utopianism. Perhaps the greatest challenge to utopian political thought comes from Bernard Williams' realism, which argues, among other things, that political values should be subject to what he calls the ‘realism constraint’, which rules out utopian arguments based on values which cannot be offered by the state as unrealistic and therefore inadmissible. This article challenges that conclusion in two ways. First, it argues (...) that the rationale for accepting Williams' original argument for the ‘realism constraint’ fails. Secondly, it argues that there is at least one genuinely political value of liberty available which is both compatible with realism and something that cannot be offered by the state, namely that of the political anarchist. This opens the way for far more ambitious and utopian forms of realist political thought and implies that the arguments of what we call political anarchists must be met by political argumentation, not simply ruled out by methodological stipulation. (shrink)

Political realists like Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss reject political moralism, where ideal ethical theory comes first, then applied principles, and politics is reduced to a kind of applied ethics. While the models of political moralism that Williams criticizes are endorsed by G.A. Cohen and Ronald Dworkin respectively, I argue that this realist case against John Rawls cannot be sustained. In explicating and defending Rawls’s realistically utopian conception of ideal theory I defend a Kantian conception of theory where (...) it is by abstracting from immediate realities that theory is fit to guide practice by providing a framework for political judgment. (shrink)

Contemporary ‘crisis studies’ seek to advance democracy by emphasizing the threats that technocracy and populism pose to a specific form of it, liberal-democracy. Crisis studies argue that, since the 1970s, technocratic policymaking has deepened economic inequality. This has fostered citizenly anger, which populists exploit. Four well-known iterations of this argument are evaluated using a political realist lens. Political realism emphasizes the historical context of politics, actors’ possible motives, and a normative orientation derived from the political order itself, rather than an (...) external ethico-moral ideal. The realist lens encourages comparison of crisis studies with historical political theory, which situates liberal-democracy within the long-term development of oligarchic systems of authority, and political history, which portrays technocracy as a product of the well-funded reaction to assertions of the democratic impulse that began in the 1970s. Populism is in this view not so much a perversion of liberal-democracy as it is a perhaps unintended consequence of anti-democratic reaction. The crisis studies make this error because based on a moral defence of the justice of the liberal-democratic order. Revealing the democratically unhelpful moralism at the core of crisis studies demonstrates the usefulness of political realism as a form of applied political theory, and not simply theory about theory. (shrink)

A World Without Why collects essays, of which some are new, others already published, on topics that interest Raymond Geuss, including architecture, theology, Marxism, tragedy, ethics and the unity of academic philosophy as a discipline. A theme running through the essays is a critical, or at least skeptical, stance towards the ‘Enlightenment project’ of explanation and rationalisation, familiar from the Frankfurt School. In Geuss, that stance may in the end express, despite everything, a thwarted Kantian hope: that reason, and (...) it alone, can make things make sense. (shrink)

Political realists have devoted much effort to clarifying the methodological specificity of realist theorising and defending its consistency as an approach to political reasoning. Yet the question of how to justify the realist approach has not received the same attention. In this article, I offer a prudential justification of political realism. To do so, I first characterise realism as anti-moralism. I then outline three possible arguments for the realist approach by availing myself of recent inquiries into the metatheoretical basis of (...) realism: The metaethical, the ethical and the prudential arguments. I explain that the prudential argument offers the most solid basis for political realism because it relies on the least controversial premises. Still, I delve into the metaethical and ethical arguments for two reasons: The prudential argument takes advantage of the theses defended by the rival arguments and elaborating the other arguments shows the comparative strengths of the prudential argument. (shrink)

Ethical concepts are, or purport to be, normative. They make claims on us: they command, oblige, recommend, or guide. Or at least when we invoke them, we make claims on one another; but where does their authority over us - or ours over one another - come from? Christine Korsgaard identifies four accounts of the source of normativity that have been advocated by modern moral philosophers: voluntarism, realism, reflective endorsement, and the appeal to autonomy. She traces their history, showing how (...) each developed in response to the prior one and comparing their early versions with those on the contemporary philosophical scene. Kant's theory that normativity springs from our own autonomy emerges as a synthesis of the other three, and Korsgaard concludes with her own version of the Kantian account. Her discussion is followed by commentary from G. A. Cohen, Raymond Geuss, Thomas Nagel, and Bernard Williams, and a reply by Korsgaard. (shrink)

Bernard Rosen argues Mill's critics and supporters address one level or another, often without noting which one it is. The positions of important ethical theorists who have been influenced by, or who criticize Mill are presented."--BOOK JACKET.

Mechanistic studies may be defined as ‘an experiment, using an intervention in healthy subjects or patients, to better understand human biology and/or disease’. Such studies provide useful physiological insights into clinical conditions in humans and expand our knowledge of physiology in health and disease. Well-planned mechanistic studies are therefore a vital step in progressing drug discovery in humans. It is important in such studies that the rights and safety of research participants are preserved, while at the same time not allowing (...) lengthy and complex approval procedures to stifle and potentially prohibit this type of research. (shrink)

Un ouvrage de Gaston Pineau, intitulé Produire sa vie. Autoformation et autobiographie a mis Bernard Honoré en chemin d'une réflexion sur le double enracinement de la formation en soi-même (autoformation) et hors de soi, par les autres et par l'environnement (hétéroformation). Ce chemin l'a amené à voir dans les histoires de vie un important courant de recherche méthodologique dans la découverte du sens de la formation en ses diverses pratiques. Puisse ce livre amener le lecteur sur une voie réflexive (...) analogue, le conduisant à explorer le sens des pratiques formatives dans lesquelles il est engagé. L'expérience d'une ouverture à la dimension existentielle de la formation par la pratique des histoires de vie, en référence à 1'autoformation, devrait inciter à questionner le sens d'un parcours en formation. (shrink)

À l'heure où le débat sur la fin de vie resurgit, Bernard Sportès nous ouvre de nouveaux horizons, dépasse les arguments simplistes et nous aide à comprendre tabous et angoisses. Son analyse, ancrée dans son expérience des fins de vie, nous rappelle que cet accompagnement ultime doit bien rester un soin. Sa vision humaniste se refuse à ces morts administrées selon des critères médicaux prédéfinis, auxquelles il oppose une mort accompagnée, assistée jusqu'aux derniers instants. Cette proposition, nouvelle dans ce (...) vieux débat, prend acte de l'évolution de nos mœurs et place le respect de la volonté au-dessus de toute autre considération. Prééminence d'une volonté trop souvent confondue avec de simples opinions. Émerge ainsi la possibilité qu'une aide à mourir s'inscrive dans la poursuite d'une prise en charge. Le législateur devra l'organiser dans la confiance en la maturité des soignants et des patients, s'éloigner du réglementaire, encourager une pensée collective et supervisée. Nos fins de vies réclament une République fraternelle qui n'abandonne personne, une médecine d'équipe qui résiste au modèle industriel où on l'entraine. Bernard Sportès nous livre finalement un message simple : nous ne mourrons pas mieux tant que nous n'aurons pas bâti cette médecine de la personne qu'il décrit et propose."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Cet article a déjà paru dans les Cahiers philosophiques, mars 2000, n° 82, p. 5-22, puis de nouveau dans un numéro hors-série consacré au « Plaisir », 2012, p. 7-21. Nous remercions les Cahiers et Bernard Sève de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Le chapitre 4 de la Poétique indique, dès sa première phrase, que l'art poétique doit sa naissance « à deux causes, toutes deux naturelles ». La première cause est immédiatement précisée et analysée : il (...) s'agit de la tendance à l'imitation, présente - Poétique et Études littéraires – GALERIE – Nouvel article. (shrink)

In his response to my article, “Historicism and Science: Thoughts on Quine” , Paul Bernays distinguishes between two aspects of the article: my criticism of Quine's theory of knowledge and my contention that the epistemological foundations of modern science lead to historicism. Bernays substantially accepts my criticism of Quine, particularly insofar as I reject Quine's behaviorism and “physicalism”. He opposes, however, my claim that historicism is implicit in the presuppositions of modern science. I argued that the historicism inherent in modern (...) science is due to the essentially changeable character of modern science. Quine's theory of knowledge tacitly takes account of this changeable character a) through his view of sense experience as being constituted by posits, b) through his recognition that individual scientific statements are dependent upon a broad linguistic‐conceptual framework that is itself subject to change, and c) through his pragmatic conception of reason and the concomitant emphasis upon the criterion of simplicity. (shrink)

Anthropology's approach to answering the question of the role of suffering in our lives is limited to empirical data and at best describes an individual's capability to endure it and make sense of it. Levinas was at odds to find meaning in suffering once it had exceeded certain proportions. Various cultures demonstrate greater and lesser capacities for integrating corporate suffering when it has crossed a significant threshold. What is the role of ritual and productive suffering in revealing meaning in suffering? (...) Some examples are drawn from the experiences of pilgrims on the Camino de Santiago de Compostella. Drawing from Dr. Eleonore Stump's exploration of second-person narratives and relationships, a Christian philosophical-theological response is provided. (shrink)